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The European power grid can be divided into several market areas where the price of electricity is determined
in a day-ahead auction. Market participants can provide continuous hourly bid curves and combinatorial bids with
associated quantities given the prices. The goal of our auction is to maximize the economic surplus of all participants
subject to quantity constraints and price constraints. The price constraints ensure that no one incurs a loss. Only
traders who submitted a combinatorial bid might miss a not-realized profit. The resulting problem is a large scale
mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) and binary variables that cannot be solved efficiently
by standard solvers. We present an exact algorithm and a fast heuristic for this type of problem. Both algorithms
decompose the MPEC into a master problem (a MIQP) and pricing subproblems (LPs). The modeling technique and
the algorithms are applicable to a wide variety of combinatorial auctions that are based on mixed integer programs.
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1. Introduction
In this article we present the market design that is currently in use by most of the European elec-
tricity exchanges. The underlying optimization problem is a welfare maximizing combinatorial
auction subject to price constraints. For each tradable commodity a single price is determined
to avoid the same commodity of having different prices to different parties. Even though the
main focus of the paper will be on solving the underlying problem, we also explain why the
market model evolved to its current state. Furthermore we will discuss the differences to unit
commitment models used in the US.
1.1. Our contribution
We provide a precise formulation of a real world optimization problem that needs to be solved
anew each day: the market coupling problem between European day-ahead electricity ex-
changes. The market is called a non-convex market because the feasible region of the underlying
optimization problem is non-convex. The non-convexity of the feasible region is caused by the
presence of binary decision variables. In such a market it is difficult to find for each tradable
commodity a single price while ensuring that no participant incurs a loss. The existence of such
prices must be enforced by complementarity conditions yielding a Mathematical Program with
Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) and binary variables. We present a deterministic algorithm
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yielding a provably optimal solution and a fast heuristic that exploits the model structure. In-
stead of solving the large scale MPEC directly we decompose it into a Mixed Integer Quadratic
Program (MIQP) and a linear pricing problem. Empirical tests suggest that the solutions de-
termined by the heuristic are optimal in many cases. We also ensure unique prices without
changing the economic surplus. Additionally, we introduce rules that allow market participants
to check whether the determined prices satisfy necessary optimality conditions of the individual
participant’s optimization problems.
1.2. Outline
The structure of the article is as follows. In Section 3 we give a brief introduction to the Euro-
pean electricity market and its features. In Section 4 we introduce the combinatorial optimiza-
tion problem that is used to determine welfare maximizing solutions subject to price constraints.
Analyzing this model we obtain optimality conditions which are formulated in Section 5. We
then establish in Section 6 the uniqueness of prices and then we formulate a clearing heuristic
and an optimal algorithm in Section 7. We conclude with computational results in Section 8
and some final remarks in Section 9.
2. Background information
In this section, we provide background information on linear prices and on the institutional
differences between US electricity markets and European electricity markets.
2.1. Linear pricing schedules
The European day-ahead electricity auctions are using linear pricing schedules. We will briefly
define the concept of pricing schedules, here in the multidimensional setting that is a straight-
forward extension of [19, p. 136].
Definition 2.1 We consider m distinct commodities. A pricing schedule T : Rm → R is a map
that returns the total amount of money to be paid by a consumer depending on his consumption
vector q ∈ Rm. The schedule is called a linear pricing schedule if the map is linear, i.e., T (q) =
pi>q. In this case pi is called a linear price vector and pii is the price per unit for commodity
i. The definition is also applicable to producers if we use −qi consumption units to model qi
production units of commodity i.
Definition 2.2 The clearing condition of a commodity c is an equation that ensures that the
number of bought units of commodity c is equal to the number of sold units of commodity c.
Definition 2.3 A pricing schedule is a strict linear pricing schedule if it is linear and the number
of commodities m is equal to the number of clearing conditions in the auction model [20]. In the
electricity market, the clearing conditions are the flow conservation equations for each network
node and time slot.
In linear programming the strong duality theorem provides that given a finite optimal solution
to a primal linear program there exists a finite optimal solution to the dual program. The vari-
ables of the dual program are called dual variables and can be interpreted as prices [5, Chapter
12]. In convex optimization strong duality holds if a constraint qualification (e.g., Slater’s con-
dition) is satisfied. In this case, the dual variables can also be interpreted as prices. Sometimes
the dual variables are also called shadow prices to the primal program [3, Chapter 5].
Now assume that x is an optimal finite solution to a convex auction model that maximizes the
economic surplus. Let Slater’s condition hold and let pi be optimal dual variables of the clearing
conditions of all commodities. Then T (q) = pi>q defines a strict linear pricing schedule and
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pi defines a linear price vector. All participants are perfectly happy with the solution x and
the prices pi, as their individual optimization problems are maximized at these prices. Such a
solution is called a competitive or Walrasian equilibrium (cf. [2]).
2.2. The US market
We begin with a short introduction to electricity markets in the US. In the US there exist sev-
eral pool-based electricity markets, operated by independent system operators (ISO). The ISOs
organize day-ahead auctions where both suppliers and consumers can submit bids. Using these
bids the auction determines prices for each network node and each hour of the next day. Fi-
nally a unit commitment model computes a dispatch that minimizes total production cost while
ensuring system reliability. A standard reference for unit commitment models is [11]. These
models allow the participants to submit the cost structure and production capacities of each
power plant. In particular it is possible to submit startup costs and minimal production capaci-
ties which are modeled by using binary variables. This detailed information allows the ISOs to
ensure system reliability while minimizing the total production cost. In many unit commitment
models the demand is assumed to be a price inelastic bid with a fixed given quantity.
Let us hypothetically assume a unit commitment problem can be described by a linear pro-
gram (LP). Then the optimal dispatch would be determined by solving the LP and a strict linear
pricing schedule is given by the dual variables of the flow conservation equations of the net-
work nodes. As soon as binary variables are involved we have to solve a mixed integer linear
program (MIP) and the determination of a reasonable strict linear pricing schedule is not as
easy as in the LP case. Given an optimal solution to a MIP, in general it is impossible to find a
strict linear pricing schedule where all participants neither incur a loss nor miss a not-realized
profit. Definition 3.6 formally introduces the concept of a not-realized profit. O’Neill et al. [17]
present a method that defines a linear pricing schedule for an optimal solution to a MIP based
unit commitment model. The main idea is to treat binary actions like separate commodities.
Then we can find linear prices for all commodities, including the binary actions. No partici-
pant incurs a loss and no participant misses a not-realized profit. Each binary action can be
attributed to a single market participant and only this participant can carry out this binary ac-
tion. For this reason the price for the individual binary action can be understood as an individual
compensation payment that is paid or received by each participant. According to [17], the elec-
tricity auctions of New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) and Pennsylvania-New
Jersey-Maryland Interconnection (PJM) are using similar pricing methods. Another technique
that defines prices for a MIP solution is called convex hull pricing ([10], [21]). This pricing
schedule reduces the impact of compensation payments but still requires the use of individual
compensation payments.
In Europe the common practice is to avoid compensation payments and to implement strict
linear prices. This major difference renders methods that are based on compensation payments
inapplicable.
2.3. The European market
Similar to the US there exist several national and regional transmission system operators (TSO)1
in Europe. The main difference to the ISOs in the US is that the European TSOs only maintain
system feasibility and reliability. They do not control the spot market for electricity, but they
determine network boundary conditions within which they can guarantee the system feasibility
and reliability. These boundary conditions (e.g., available transmission capacities) are submit-
1Nordic TSOs (NPS region): Elering, Energinet.dk, Fingrid, Litgrid, Statnett SF, Svenska Kraftnät. Central Western Europe TSOs
(CWE region): Amprion, Creos Luxembourg, Elia System Operator, Rte, Tennet TSO, TransnetBW. (cf. www.entsoe.eu)
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Figure 1. NPS and CWE region in 2011 (The Europe map is taken from Wikipedia)
ted to independent power exchanges (PX)2 who will run the financial spot market auctions
subject to the network constraints. Some power exchanges also split their market into several
bidding areas. These bidding areas are often given by national borders or network bottlenecks.
For example the power exchange EPEX Spot splits its market into the bidding areas France,
Germany/Austria, and Switzerland.
On top of these power exchanges, market coupling systems collect all order book data from
the power exchanges and network constraints from the TSOs and compute welfare maximizing
power flows between adjacent market areas and prices for the bidding areas of the power ex-
changes. These flows and price signals are submitted back to the exchanges and TSOs. Finally
the exchanges run their own auction incorporating the cross-border flows and the price signals.
For example the SESAM system couples the bidding areas of the Nordic region (NPS region)
that consists of Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden. The COSMOS
system couples the bidding areas of the Central Western European region (CWE region) that
consists of Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and Netherlands. On top of these cou-
pling systems, European Market Coupling Company (EMCC) is computing the flows between
the NPS and the CWE region. SESAM is in use since 2007 and in Nov. 2009 EMCC started
to couple the NPS region with Germany. In Nov. 2010 COSMOS was launched and from there
on the EMCC system is coupling the NPS and the CWE region.1 Figure 1 shows the intercon-
nected NPS and CWE region in 2011. Note that these systems are distinct entities and guided
by different regulations while maintaining a certain set of compatibility constraints as put forth
in the European regulation of energy markets.
All European power exchanges that we consider here are already existing and are using strict
linear pricing schedules. Electricity at a specific bidding area at the specific time it is being
2Nordic PX (NPS region): Nordpool Spot AS. Central Western Europe PXs (CWE region): APX Endex, Belpex, EPEX Spot.
1cf. www.nordpoolspot.com/About-us/History, www.epexspot.com/en/market-coupling, and www.marketcoupling.com.
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delivered is viewed as a commodity. Thus, for each bidding area and each hour of the next day
an electricity price (BC/MWh) is computed, such that no compensation payments are needed.
This will not be subject to change in the foreseeable future. The strict linear pricing schedule is
determined by a welfare maximizing optimization problem subject to quantity constraints and
additional price constraints. In order to perform a correct market coupling between such power
exchanges a market coupling system needs to model the underlying power exchanges exactly
as they are. For this reason a European market coupling system must also implement a strict
linear pricing schedule and thus cannot implement any other pricing schedule.
As of now, the TSOs in the NPS and the CWE region only submit upper and lower bounds
for the flows and upper bounds for the change of flows. Therefore a market coupling system
that couples these two regions only implements these basic transmission constraints. However
the algorithms that we present can be easily adjusted to solve more complex transmission con-
strains, as long as the constraints are linear or convex. In the CWE region the introduction of
so called power transmission distribution factor matrices (PTDF) is planned for 2014 [1].
3. Bidding language in European day-ahead electricity auctions
Usually the auctioneer defines a bidding language that allows the participants for expressing
their bids, or in other words, their preferences. In a day-ahead electricity auction participants
bid today for electricity that they want to buy or sell on the following day. They are allowed to
submit their bids up to a predetermined point in time. As soon as the submission deadline has
passed the submitted bids cannot be changed anymore and the auctioneer has to decide which
bids to accept and which bids to reject. Then the auctioneer publishes a pricing schedule that
determines the amount of money that a participant has to pay or receive if his bid was accepted.
The day-ahead electricity auctions in the CWE and NPS region have a common bidding
language. The bidding language allows for submitting four different types of bids: hourly bid
curves, block bids, flexible bids, and cross border trades. The number of different commodities
the participants can bid for is given by the number of market areas times the number of time
slots of the next day (e.g., 24 hours). For this reason an entry of a strict linear price vector re-
flects the price for one electrical power unit that is delivered at a specific market area throughout
a specific time slot.
In order to refer to a specific area or time slot we will use the following notation: The set A
denotes the set of market areas and T denotes the set of time slots. An entry of a strict linear
price vector pi will be called price in area a ∈ A at time t ∈ T and is denoted by pia,t ∈ R. We
now define the four bid types in a formal way that suits the later exposition.
3.1. Hourly bid curve
A participant can submit hourly bid curves for every area and hour to specify the optimal
quantities that he is willing to buy or sell depending on a given price. At first we will study a
simple linear bid curve to understand the details of bid curves, then we will see that the concept
of linear bid curves can be used to express piecewise linear bid curves.
Assume that a participant submits a linear bid curve h to buy electricity in area a at time t. He
wants to buy at most δh > 0 units and at least δh = 0 units. Let his marginal willingness to pay
be given by an affine non-increasing function m(u) = ph − ∆phu. Figure 2 depicts his marginal
willingness to pay. The function valuates the price that the consumer is willing to pay for each
additional unit. If the function is constant (∆ph = 0), then the price he is willing to pay for the
first consumed unit is equal to the price he is willing to pay for the last consumed unit. His
willingness to pay for the consumption of δh ∈ [δh, δh] quantity units is given by
∫ δh
0 mh(u) du.
If mh is constant, then this term reduces to ph · δh. In this case he would buy electricity if the
price per unit is lower or equal to ph. We will now assume that the participant is interested in
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Figure 2. marginal willingness to pay, consumer surplus, surplus maximizing quantities, and linear bid curve
maximizing his consumer surplus.
Definition 3.1 The consumer surplus of a participant is his willingness to pay for the consump-
tion of q units minus the total amount of money to be paid for q units (cf. [19, p. 8]).
Let the price per unit in area a at time t be exogenously given by the auctioneer and let it
amount to pia,t currency units per quantity unit. The participant has only one decision variable:
the quantity δh that he wants to buy. He can maximize his consumer surplus by solving the
following parameterized optimization problem (pia,t is an exogenously given parameter).
max
∫ δh
0
mh(u) du − pia,tδh (QP-Hourly)
s.t. δh ≤ δh ≤ δh
Definition 3.2 Let mh : [δh, δh] → R be an affine non-increasing function and let 0 ∈ [δh, δh].
The set of surplus maximizing quantities depending on the price is given by
Hh(pia,t) := argmax
δh≤δh≤δh
∫ δh
0
mh(u) du − pia,tδh.
Note thatHh(pia,t) is equal to [δh, δh] if mh is constant and pia,t = ph. The two-dimensional set
Lh :=
{(
δh, pia,t
)
| pia,t ∈ R and δh ∈ Hh(pia,t)
}
is called a linear bid curve. It is called linear, because it contains exactly one linear segment
that indicates a change in the quantity. Figure 2 illustrates both definitions.
In Section 4 we will study the optimality conditions that characterize the surplus maximizing
quantities; for now, it suffices to be aware of the structure of linear bid curves as depicted in
Figure 2.
If a participant wants to submit a more complex bid curve he can simply submit a set H
of linear bid curves to construct a piecewise linear bid curve LH . The following definition
formally introduces piecewise linear bid curves and Figure 3 provides an example.
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Figure 3. construction of piecewise linear bid curves with the help of linear bid curves
Definition 3.3 Let H be a finite set of linear bid curves and let mh : [δh, δh] → R be an affine
non-increasing function and 0 ∈ [δh, δh] for all h ∈ H. The two dimensional set
LH :=
{(∑
h∈H δh, pia,t
)
| pia,t ∈ R and δh ∈ Hh(pia,t) for h ∈ H
}
is called a piecewise linear bid curve. Let Ha,t be the set of all linear bid curves in area a at
time t. The piecewise linear bid curve LHa,t is called the aggregated bid curve of area a at time
t.
Now suppose that a participant wants to sell electricity in area a at time t. He is able to
generate at most |δh| units and at least δh = 0 units. The maximal supply quantity is modeled
by a negative number δh < 0. This allows us for using the definitions from above, such that we
do not need to distinguish between demand and supply. A positive quantity indicates demand
and a negative quantity indicates supply. Like above, we assume that the marginal cost curve
mh : [δh, δh]→ R is an affine non-increasing function: the last supplied unit (unit δh) is the most
expensive one, the first supplied unit is the cheapest one. The cost for generating δh ∈ [δh, δh]
units is given by
∫ 0
δh
mh(u) du.
Definition 3.4 The producer surplus of a participant is the amount of money to be received for
producing q units minus the cost for generating q units. Figure 4 provides an example.
In Equation (1) it can be shown that the producer and consumer surplus can be expressed by
the same formula. For this reason the producer can maximize his producer surplus by solving
(QP-Hourly).
pia,t(−δh) −
∫ 0
δh
mh(u) du =
∫ δh
0
mh(u) du − pia,tδh (1)
3.1.1. Notation used for hourly bid curves
As we have seen in the previous section, we do not need to model piecewise linear bid curves
directly. It is sufficient to treat each underlying linear bid curve separately. For this reason we
only need one set of linear bid curves for each area and time to model all piecewise linear bid
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curves that were submitted by the participants.
H set of all linear bid curves
Ha,t ⊆ H set of all linear bid curves in area a at time t
δh ≤ 0 ≤ δh quantity bounds of the linear bid curve h ∈ H
mh : [δh, δh]→ R affine non-increasing marginal willingness to pay / marginal cost for h ∈ H
δh ∈ [δh, δh] decision variable: bought quantity if positive / sold quantity if negative
3.2. Block bids
Block bids enable traders to buy or sell electricity in an area for several (not necessarily con-
secutive) time slots with a single bid. A block bid can either be executed entirely or it is not
executed at all. This condition is called fill-or-kill condition. Suppose that a participant wants
to buy electricity in area a and wants to use a block bid b. Then for each hour t ∈ T he has to
specify the quantity qb,t that he wants to buy or sell. Positive quantities indicate that he wants
to buy electricity and negative quantities indicate that he wants to sell electricity. Currently it is
only allowed to transmit either a pure buy bid with qb,t ≥ 0 or a pure sell bid with qb,t ≤ 0 for
all t ∈ T (cf. [8]). Let βb ∈ {0, 1} be the binary variable that models whether the bid b is (βb = 1)
or is not (βb = 0) executed. Then
∑
t∈T qb,tβb is the total bought (or sold) quantity. Let pb be
his constant marginal willingness to pay, i.e., for each bought electricity unit he is willing to
pay pb currency units. His willingness to pay for the consumption of
∑
t∈T qb,tβb units is given
by pb ·∑t∈T qb,tβb. Let the price pia,t in area a and time t be given, then the price-parameterized
surplus maximization problem for bid b looks as follows:
max pb
∑
t∈T
qb,tβb −
∑
t∈T
pia,tqb,tβb (MIP-BlockBid)
s.t. βb ∈ {0, 1}
The auctioneer cannot guarantee that at the end of the auction the binary variable βb is a surplus
maximizing solution to (MIP-BlockBid), because this is simply impossible in general.
Example 3.5 Let the set of areas and the set of hours be singletons: A = {a}, T = {t}. Bid b is a
sell block bid with quantity qb,t = −1 MWh and marginal cost pb = 1 BC/MWh. Bid c is a buy
block bid with quantity qc,t = 2 MWh and marginal willingness to pay pc = 2BC/MWh. The two
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orders cannot be matched, because of the different quantities. The only feasible solution is to
reject both bids, that is, βb = βc = 0. If we publish a price that is strictly smaller than 2BC/MWh,
then bid c is wondering why it is rejected. If we publish a price that is strictly greater than 1
BC/MWh, then bid b is wondering why it is rejected. Therefore, there exists no price where
everyone is perfectly happy: there is no price pia,t such that βb maximizes (MIP-BlockBid)b and
βc maximizes (MIP-BlockBid)c.
Instead of ensuring the individual surplus maximization of a block bid, the auctioneer ensures
that the surplus is non-negative if the block bid is executed. In other words, a buy block bid can
only be executed if the willingness to pay is greater or equal to the amount of money to be paid:
pb
∑
t∈T
qb,tβb −
∑
t∈T
pia,tqb,tβb ≥ 0. (2)
If the block bid is a sell block bid, then all quantities are smaller or equal to zero: qb,t ≤ 0. In
this case pb is the marginal cost of production and equation (2) ensures that the sell block bid
can only be executed if the money to be received for generating electricity is greater or equal to
the cost for generating the electricity: −∑t∈T pia,tqb,tβb ≥ −pb ∑t∈T qb,tβb.
Definition 3.6 A block bid b incurs a loss if equation (2) is violated. A block bid b misses a
not-realized profit if it is rejected even though
pb
∑
t∈T
qb,t −
∑
t∈T
pia,tqb,t > 0, (3)
holds. Block bids that miss a not-realized profit, are called paradoxically rejected bids (PRB),
because they are rejected even though from the local point of view of the owner of the block the
rejection is not a surplus maximizing solution to (MIP-BlockBid).
In Example 3.5 either block b or block c is paradoxically rejected, showing that paradoxically
rejected blocks are inevitable.
The trader further has the possibility to link certain block bids so that the execution of some
block b1 ∈ B implies the execution of some other block b2 ∈ B.
3.2.1. Notation used for block bids
B set of all block bids
Ba ⊆ B set of all block bids in area a
L ⊆ B × B if (b, c) ∈ L, then b can only be executed if also c is executed
qb,t ∈ R quantity to be bought (≥ 0) / sold (≤ 0) in hour t ∈ T by block bid b
pb ∈ R constant marginal willingness to pay / marginal cost of block bid b
βb ∈ {0, 1} decision variable: rejected (0) / executed (1)
3.3. Flexible bids
With flexible bids a participant can buy or sell electricity in a specific area in exactly one hour
without specifying the hour in which the bid should be executed. Flexible bids must satisfy the
fill-or-kill condition as well, i.e., a partial execution is not feasible. Suppose that a participant
wants to buy q f > 0 units in area a in a not specified time slot. Let his marginal willingness
to pay amount to p f currency units per quantity unit. We need to introduce one binary variable
ϕ f ,t ∈ {0, 1} for each time slot t ∈ T . If ϕ f ,t = 1, then the flexible bid f is executed in time slot t.
The bid may only be executed in at most one time slot:
∑
t∈T ϕ f ,t ≤ 1. The willingness to pay for
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the total consumed quantity of q f
∑
t∈T ϕ f ,t units is given by p f q f
∑
t∈T ϕ f ,t. Now we can write
down the price-parameterized surplus maximization problem of a flexible bid.
max p f q f
∑
t∈T
ϕ f ,t −
∑
t∈T
pia,tq fϕ f ,t (MIP-FlexBid)
s.t.
∑
t∈T
ϕ f ,t ≤ 1
ϕ f ,t ∈ {0, 1} for t ∈ T
In general it is impossible to ensure that at the end of the auction all decision variables ϕ f ,t
will be surplus maximizing for (MIP-FlexBid), but it is possible to ensures that the surplus is
non-negative if the flexible bid is executed:
p f q f
∑
t∈T
ϕ f ,t −
∑
t∈T
pia,tq fϕ f ,t ≥ 0. (4)
If this inequality is violated, then the flexible bid incurs a loss. At the end of the auction some
flexible bids might miss a not-realized profit, i.e., from the local point of view of the owner of
a flexible bid the current solution is not necessarily surplus maximizing for (MIP-FlexBid).
3.3.1. Notation used for flexible bids
F set of all flexible bids
Fa ⊆ F set of all flexible bids in area a
q f ∈ R quantity to be bought (> 0) / sold (< 0) by flexible bid f
p f ∈ R constant marginal willingness to pay / marginal cost of flexible bid f
ϕ f ,t ∈ {0, 1} decision variable: ϕ f ,t =
1 flexible bid f ∈ F is executed in hour t ∈ T0 no execution
3.4. Cross-border trades
Trading electricity across areas is called a cross-border trade. The regulatory body stipulates
that in European day-ahead electricity auctions, only transmission system operators are allowed
to perform cross border trades. The cross-border trader buys electricity in low price areas and
sells electricity in high price areas. Cross-border trades are only possible if there are intercon-
nectors connecting the areas. The latter will be denoted by C ⊆ A × A, where A is the set of
areas. An interconnector c = (r, s) ∈ C is modeled by a directed arc, whereas r denotes the
source and s denotes the sink. The transmitted electricity on interconnector c ∈ C in time slot
t ∈ T is denoted by a signed variable τc,t. We use the convention that a positive flow indicates
a transfer from the source r to the sink s, and a negative flow indicates a transfer from s to
r. There are upper and lower bounds [τc,t, τc,t] on the transmission quantity. These bounds are
called available transmission capacity (ATC). Also the change of flow between two consecu-
tive hours can be limited by an upper bound τ˜c, called ramp rate. Now suppose that there is a
positive flow τc,t > 0 on interconnector c = (r, s) in hour t, then electricity is bought in area r
and sold in area s. The marginal cost for buying electricity is pir,t and the price per unit to be
received for selling electricity is pis,t. The surplus of a cross-border trade is called congestion
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rent and can be maximized by solving the following price-parameterized optimization problem.
max
∑
t∈T
(pis,t − pir,t)τc,t (LP-TSO)
s.t. ∀t ∈ T τc,t ≤ τc,t ≤ τc,t
∀t ∈ T − τ˜c ≤ τc,t − τc,t−1 ≤ τ˜c
The parameter τc,−1 is the given flow of the last hour of the previous day.
At the end of the auction the flows will be congestion rent maximizing, but we need to keep in
mind that the cross-border trader is considered a price taker, i.e., the price is exogenously given
by the auctioneer. We will later see that in this case the optimality conditions of cross-border
trades imply that prices only diverge, if a transmission constraint is active.
3.4.1. Notation used for cross-border trades
C ⊂ A × A set of all interconnectors
C+a = {(r, s) ∈ C | r = a} set of all interconnectors starting in a
C−a = {(r, s) ∈ C | s = a} set of all interconnectors ending in a
τc,−1 ∈ R flow on c in the last time slot of the previous day
τ˜c ∈ R+0 ∪ {∞} ramp rate; we put τ˜c = ∞ if we have no ramping on c
τc,t ∈ [τc,t, τc,t] decision variable: flow on c ∈ C in time t ∈ T within bounds (ATC)
4. Optimization problem of the auctioneer
In this section we will present the complete MPEC with binary variables that describes the
auctioneers optimization problem. The aim of the auctioneer is to maximize the total economic
surplus subject to the clearing condition and the constraints given by the submitted bids. We
first introduce the overall model structure and then discuss the objective function as well as
each constraint in detail.
The primal variables of the model (MPEC) are β, φ, τ, δ and pi, ρ, ρ, µ, µ, v, v. The former
are used to model the executed quantities and the latter are used to model the price con-
straints. In the next section we show that the primal variables ρ, ρ, µ, µ, and v, v in this
model are used to model the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions (KKT) of the price-
parameterized surplus maximization problems of cross-border trades (LP-TSO) and linear bid
curves (QP-Hourly). A short introduction to the KKT optimality conditions can be found in [3,
Chapter 5.5.3]. Because of the KKT conditions, some of the price constraints are non-convex.
The bar below or above the variables ρ, ρ, µ, µ, v, v indicates that the variable is associated with
a lower or upper quantity bound of a quantity constraint of (LP-TSO) or (QP-Hourly). For ex-
ample the variable vh is associated with the upper quantity bound δh ≤ δh of (QP-Hourly). We
will make this precise below. As the auctioneer needs to compute surplus maximizing quanti-
ties to the surplus maximization problems of linear bid curves and cross-border trades, the dual
variables of these subproblems are primal variables in the auctioneers optimization problem.
We need to explicitly add the optimality conditions (price conditions) to the model, because
they are not necessarily automatically fulfilled in an optimal solution.
An important property of the model is that the determined strict linear prices are consistent
with the strict linear prices that we know from convex auctions: Assume that we solve a relaxed
model that only contains the quantity constraints (except for constraint (C3)) and assume that its
12 A. Martin, J.C. Müller, S. Pokutta
max (economic surplus)
∑
h∈H
∫ δh
0
mh(u)du +
∑
b∈B
t∈T
pb qb,t βb +
∑
f∈F
t∈T
p f q f ϕ f ,t (MPEC)
s.t. (quantity constraints)
∀a ∈ A, t ∈ T
∑
h∈Ha,t
δh +
∑
b∈Ba
qb,tβb +
∑
f∈Fa
q fϕ f ,t =
∑
c∈C−a
τc,t −
∑
c∈C+a
τc,t (C1)
∀c ∈ C, t ∈ T − τ˜c ≤ τc,t − τc,t−1 ≤ τ˜c (C2)
∀(b, c) ∈ L βb ≤ βc (C3)
∀ f ∈ F
∑
t∈T
ϕ f ,t ≤ 1 (C4)
∀b ∈ B βb ∈ {0, 1}
∀ f ∈ F, t ∈ T ϕ f ,t ∈ {0, 1}
∀c ∈ C, t ∈ T τc,t ∈ [τc,t, τc,t]
∀h ∈ H δh ∈ [δh, δh]
(price constraints)
strict linear prices:
∀a ∈ A, t ∈ T pia,t ∈ R
non-negative surplus of block and flexible bids:
∀a ∈ A, b ∈ Ba βb
∑
t∈T
(pb − pia,t) qb,t ≥ 0 (C5)
∀a ∈ A, f ∈ Fa, t ∈ T ϕ f ,t(p f − pia,t) sgn(q f ) ≥ 0 (C6)
optimality conditions of cross-border flow, (LP-TSO):
∀c = (r, s) ∈ C, t ∈ T (µc,t − µc,t) + (ρc,t − ρc,t) + [(ρc,t+1 − ρc,t+1)] = pis,t − pir,t (C7)
∀c ∈ C, t ∈ T (τc,t − τc,t) µc,t = 0 (C7)
∀c ∈ C, t ∈ T (−τc,t + τc,t) µc,t = 0 (C7)
∀c ∈ C, t ∈ T (τc,t − τc,t−1 − τ˜c) ρc,t = 0 (C7)
∀c ∈ C, t ∈ T (τc,t−1 − τc,t − τ˜c) ρc,t = 0 (C7)
∀c ∈ C, t ∈ T µc,t, µc,t, ρc,t, ρc,t ≥ 0 (C7)
optimality conditions of linear bid curves, (QP-Hourly):
∀a ∈ A, t ∈ T , h ∈ Ha,t − mh(δh) + pia,t + vh − vh = 0 (C8)
∀a ∈ A, t ∈ T , h ∈ Ha,t (δh − δh) vh = 0 (C8)
∀a ∈ A, t ∈ T , h ∈ Ha,t (−δh + δh) vh = 0 (C8)
∀a ∈ A, t ∈ T , h ∈ Ha,t vh, vh ≥ 0 (C8)
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QP-relaxation admits an integral optimal solution, with respect to the binary variables. Then we
can find strict linear prices to this optimal solution that satisfy all previously mentioned price
conditions. In this case, all price conditions are dispensable and could be omitted. This assertion
can be verified by writing down the KKT conditions of the QP-relaxation. Van Vyve proves this
assertion in Proposition 3 in [20]. The same result in a similar context is also provided in [2,
Corollary 11.16].
4.1. Constraints
We now introduce the constraints mentioned above and explain them in detail.
(C1) Clearing condition. This constraint ensures the identity of executed net demand and
net import. The constraint is similar to the classical conservation of flow constraint
typically present in network flow models. In every area and every hour the executed net
demand must coincide with the net import:
∀a ∈ A, t ∈ T
∑
h∈Ha,t
δh +
∑
b∈Ba
qb,tβb +
∑
f∈Fa
q fϕ f ,t =
∑
c∈C−a
τc,t −
∑
c∈C+a
τc,t .
(C2) Ramping condition. This condition incorporates the ramping requirements on the in-
terconnectors by limiting the change between two consecutive time slots accordingly.
From one hour to the next hour the flow on interconnector c may only change by τ˜c
units:
∀c ∈ C, t ∈ T |τc,t − τc,t−1| ≤ τ˜c .
(C3) Block bid links. To model the linking of block bids we add the following constraint. If
(b, c) ∈ L, then block b may only be executed if block c is executed:
∀(b, c) ∈ L βb ≤ βc .
(C4) Flexible bid execution at most once. A flexible bid f can be executed in at most one
time slot:
∀ f ∈ F
∑
t∈T
ϕ f ,t ≤ 1 .
(C5) Block price condition. In principle it is possible to obtain an equally high or even
higher economic surplus by requiring altruistic behavior from some of the participants.
However this is not in line with general economic principles as no participant is willing
to sell at a loss. Therefore, a block bid can only be executed if it does not incur a loss:
∀a ∈ A, b ∈ Ba βb
∑
t∈T
(pb − pia,t) qb,t ≥ 0 .
As mentioned before the converse cannot be guaranteed: some block bids might miss
a not-realized profit at the end of the auction. In other words, they might be rejected,
even though the prices would allow the execution.
The block price condition is a quadratic non-convex constraint that is difficult to
handle, but it is easy to linearize it if we introduce a sufficiently large constant Mb for
each b ∈ B. We know that βb is a binary variable and we assume that pia,t ∈ [p, p]. Now
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we can rewrite the constraint as follows (cf. [5, Chapter 26-3-I(g)]):∑
t∈T
(pb − pia,t) qb,t ≥ Mb(1 − βb) with Mb :=
∑
t∈T
min{(pb − pi) qb,t | pi ∈ [p, p]} .
(C6) Flexible bid price condition. A flexible bid is only executed if it does not incur a loss:
∀a ∈ A, f ∈ Fa, t ∈ T ϕ f ,t(p f − pia,t) sgn(q f ) ≥ 0,
where sgn(.) denotes the sign function. This formulation is equivalent to equation (4).
Similar to block bids, also flexible bids might miss a not-realized profit, i.e., they might
get rejected, even though the prices would allow the execution.
(C7) Flow price condition. This condition represents the optimality condition of the cross-
border traders optimization problem. The regulators force them to be price takers such
that the prices are externally given by the auctioneer and the only remaining decision
variable is the flow τc,t. The individual optimization problem is to maximize the con-
gestion rent subject to the available transmission capacity and the ramp rate:
max
∑
c∈C
∑
t∈T
(pis,t − pir,t)τc,t (LP-TSO)
s.t. [µ] ∀c ∈ C, t ∈ T τc,t ≤ τc,t ATC
[µ] ∀c ∈ C, t ∈ T − τc,t ≤ −τc,t ATC
[ρ] ∀c ∈ C, t ∈ T τc,t − τc,t−1 ≤ τ˜c ramp rate
[ρ] ∀c ∈ C, t ∈ T τc,t−1 − τc,t ≤ τ˜c ramp rate
The variables in squared brackets are the dual variables to the primal constraints. By
duality, essentially an optimal flow implies that a price difference between two adjacent
areas implies that at least one transmission constraint is active. The KKT conditions
provide a precise description of an optimal flow. From now on the KKT conditions of
(LP-TSO) will be called the flow price condition.
Definition 4.1 (Flow price condition) Let τ ∈ RC×T , τc,t ≤ τ ≤ τc,t, and pi ∈ PA×T . The
flow-price tuple (τ, pi) satisfies the flow price condition if there exist µ, µ, ρ, ρ ∈ RC×T so
that for all c = (r, s) ∈ C and t ∈ T
µc,t, µc,t
, ρc,t, ρc,t
≥ 0 , (5)
(µc,t − µc,t) + (ρc,t − ρc,t) + [(ρc,t+1 − ρc,t+1)] + pir,t − pis,t = 0 , (6)
(τc,t − τc,t) µc,t = 0 , (7)
(−τc,t + τc,t) µc,t = 0 , (8)
(τc,t − τc,t−1 − τ˜c) ρc,t = 0 , (9)
(τc,t−1 − τc,t − τ˜c) ρc,t = 0 . (10)
In terms of duality theory the conditions (5) and (6) correspond to dual feasibility
conditions and the remaining ones are complementarity conditions. The term in square
brackets is only added if t + 1 ∈ T.
In the following we provide three implications that help to understand the properties
of an optimal flow. A derivation of these implications can be found in Appendix A.
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If there is no ramping on an interconnector c = (r, s), this condition simplifies to
∀t ∈ T pis,t − pir,t
≤ 0 , τc,t < τc,t≥ 0 , τc,t < τc,t . (11)
The economic interpretation of this simplified condition is that free transfer capacity
in the forward direction implies that the price pir,t in the source area must be higher
or equal to the price pis,t in the sink area. If this would not be the case, then the free
capacity should be used to transfer additional electricity from the source to the sink,
and therefore the market would not be in an equilibrium.
If, on the other hand, the ramping condition (C2) on an interconnector c = (r, s) is
only binding (i.e., satisfied with equality) in two consecutive hours t and t+1, and there
is still available transfer capacity in that time window, then the condition simplifies to:
pis,t − pir,t = −(pis,t+1 − pir,t+1) . (12)
This establishes that the price difference at one point in time can have an impact on the
price difference in the following ones.
As mentioned before the flow price condition implies that prices of adjacent areas
can only deviate if at least one respective transmission constraint is active (terms in
square brackets are only present if t + 1 ∈ T ):
∀ c = (r, s) ∈ C, t ∈ T
pir,t < pis,t ⇒ τc,t = τc,t ∨ τc,t − τc,t−1 = τ˜c [∨ τc,t − τc,t+1 = τ˜c ] , (13)
pir,t > pis,t ⇒ τc,t = τc,t ∨ τc,t−1 − τc,t = τ˜c [∨ τc,t+1 − τc,t = τ˜c ] . (14)
(C8) Filling condition of linear bid curves. This constraint represents the optimality con-
ditions of linear bid curves. Participants who submit linear bid curves are modeled as
price takers. In the optimization problem associated with a linear bid curve h the price
is exogenously given and the only remaining decision variable is δh. The objective is to
maximize the economic surplus.
max
∫ δh
0
(mh(u) − pia,t) du (QP-Hourly)
s.t. [v] + δh ≤ δh
[v] − δh ≤ δh
with mh(δh) = ph − ∆phδh. The variables in squared brackets correspond to the dual
variables of this problem. From now on the KKT conditions of this price-parameterized
optimization problem will be called filling condition.
Definition 4.2 (Filling condition) Let δh ≤ δh ≤ δh for h ∈ H and pi ∈ PA×T . The tuple
(δ, pi) satisfies the filling condition if and only if there exist variables v, v ∈ RH so that
for all a ∈ A, t ∈ T, h ∈ Ha,t
−mh(δh) + pia,t + vh − vh = 0 (15)
(+δh − δh) vh = 0 (16)
(−δh + δh) vh = 0 (17)
vh, vh ≥ 0 . (18)
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This condition can be reformulated to an equivalent condition:
Proposition 4.3 (Filling condition) Let δh ≤ δh ≤ δh for h ∈ H and pi ∈ PA×T . The tuple
(δ, pi) satisfies the filling condition if and only if
∀a ∈ A, t ∈ T , h ∈ Ha,t with δh < δh : pia,t

≤ mh(δh), if δh = δh
= mh(δh), if δh ∈ (δh, δh)
≥ mh(δh), if δh = δh
(19)
with mh(δh) = ph − ∆phδh.
Proof Let a ∈ A, t ∈ T , and h ∈ Ha,t. If δh = δh then vh and vh are free and (15)
is trivially satisfied. Let δh < δh. We will now consider three cases. In the first case,
let δh = δh. Then vh = 0 and vh ≥ 0, and (15) simplifies to −mh(δh) + pia,t ≤ 0. For
the second case suppose δh ∈ (δh, δh). Then vh = 0 and vh = 0, and (15) simplifies to−mh(δh) + pia,t = 0. For the last case, let δh = δh. Then vh ≥ 0 and vh = 0, and (15)
simplifies to −mh(δh) + pia,t ≥ 0. 
The second definition directly shows that an optimal solution only contains quantity-
price-combinations (δ, pi) that were defined by the piecewise linear bid curves. A MIP
formulation of the filling condition based on the delta-method (cf. [5, Chapter 26-3-
I(f)]) can be found in Appendix B and a graphical illustration is given in Figure 5.
net quantity
: price: price : price net demand curve
: price
abs. quantity
: price supply curve
demand curve
resp.
Figure 5. The tuple (δ′, pi′) satisfies the filling condition. The points (δ′h, pi
′
a,t) are inLh for h = 1, 2, 3 and the point (δ′1+δ′2+δ′3, pi′a,t)
is in L{1,2,3}.
4.2. Additional market rules
For the sake of completeness we need to mention that there exist additional market rules that
are not covered by the previous model. Some of these additional rules are only valid for either
the CWE region or the NPS region. For example in the CWE region there is a parameter that
prevents block bids with low marginal costs or high marginal willingness to pay from being
rejected. In the NPS region participants can submit so called convertible block bids. A convert-
ible block bid is basically a block bid, but if it gets rejected, it is transformed into several linear
hourly bid curves and the auction starts again. Some interconnectors are facing a significant
transmission loss. The factor that models this loss is called deadband. There also exist rules
related to situations with extremely high or low area prices: The exchanges impose additional
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upper and lower bounds on the prices. If a price reaches a bound then curtailment rules come
into effect: If for example an area price is at its upper bound, then demand block bids in this
area have a lower priority than linear bid curves. Except for the different price intervals we will
not explain these rules in detail as they are out of the scope of this paper.
Remark 1 Different price intervals. The prices in the NPS region are limited to [−200, 2000]
BC/MW whereas the prices in the CWE region are limited to [−3000, 3000] BC/MW. On the on
hand the area prices pia,t must be within the specific regional bounds. On the other hand all
submitted price limits (marginal willingness to pay / marginal cost) must be within the specific
regional price interval: Let Pa be the feasible price interval in area a, then pb, p f ∈ Pa for all
block bids b and flexible bids f in area a, and mh([δh, δh]) ⊆ Pa for all linear bid curves h in
area a. Note that linear bid curves are defined for all prices pia,t in R and that they are parallel
to the price axis for prices in R \ Pa.
If a solution contains a price pia,t < Pa, then pia,t is changed to the nearest price in Pa. By doing
so, we might violate the flow price condition. In other words, there might be a price difference
between two adjacent areas although none of the transport restrictions is binding. In fact, this
might happen if one of the areas has a small price interval and reaches the maximal possible
hourly demand or supply.
4.3. Objective function
The economic surplus is the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus (cf. [18]). It is also
called global welfare (cf. [12]) or social welfare. For example a consumer buys q units at a
price of pi per unit and he is willing to pay a price of p ≥ pi, then his consumer surplus is given
by (p− pi)q. The producer surplus generated by hourly bid curves is determined accordingly by
integrating the price per unit minus the producers marginal cost over the quantity from zero to
the produced quantity.
In Section 3 we already introduced the price-parameterized surplus maximization problems
of each trading product. We will now summarize the results from above.
Definition 4.4 The surplus of a linear bid curve h ∈ Ha,t in area a and hour t is given by
ωh(pi, δ) :=
∫ δh
0
mh(u) du − pia,tδh (20)
where mh(δh) = ph − ∆phδh. Expression (20) is equivalent to the net consumers/producers
surplus in [12, Chapter 2.2]. Examples are provided in Figures 2 and 4.
Definition 4.5 The surplus of a block bid b ∈ Ba with a ∈ A for pi ∈ RA×T and β ∈ {0, 1}B is
given by
ωb(pi, β) :=
∑
t∈T
pbqb,tβb −
∑
t∈T
pia,tqb,tβb.
Definition 4.6 The surplus of a flexible bid f ∈ Fa with a ∈ A for pi ∈ RA×T and ϕ ∈ {0, 1}F×T
is given by
ω f (pi, ϕ) :=
∑
t∈T
p f q fϕ f ,t −
∑
t∈T
pia,tq fϕ f ,t.
Another surplus arises on the interconnectors. This surplus represents the surplus of cross-
border trades and is usually referred to as congestion rent.
Definition 4.7 The congestion rent on interconnector c = (r, s) ∈ C for pi ∈ RA×T and τ ∈ RC×T
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is given by:
ωc,t(pi, τ) :=
∑
t∈T
(pis,t − pir,t)τc,t .
Note that the congestion rent is indeed contained in the economic surplus in most market
models run today. The surplus generated due to congestion rent is usually reinvested in order
to reduce tariffs or build new lines1. Later we will see that the flows are not uniquely deter-
mined by the maximal economic surplus, but in general ambiguities only exist, when prices of
adjacent areas coincide. In these situations, there is no price difference (pis,t − pir,t) and thus no
congestion rent, and the congestion rent cannot be influenced by changing the flow τc,t within
the ambiguities. For more details on ambiguities of flows and how to choose unique flows refer
to Section 6.3.
Definition 4.8 Let (pi, β, ϕ, δ, τ) be feasible for (MPEC). The economic surplus of the market is
the sum of the surpluses of all market participants and is computed as follows:
ω(pi, β, ϕ, δ, τ) =
∑
a∈A
∑
t∈T
∑
h∈Ha,t
ωh(pi, δ) +
∑
a∈A
∑
b∈Ba
ωb(pi, β) +
∑
a∈A
∑
f∈Fa
ω f (pi, ϕ) (21)
+
∑
c=(r,s)∈C
ωc,t(pi, τ)
=
∑
a∈A
∑
t∈T
 ∑
h∈Ha,t
∫ δh
0
mh(z)dz +
∑
b∈Ba
pb qb,t βb +
∑
f∈Fa
p f q f ϕ f ,t
 (22)
−
∑
a∈A
∑
t∈T
 ∑
h∈Ha,t
pia,tδh +
∑
b∈Ba
pia,tqb,tβb +
∑
f∈Fa
pia,tq fϕ f ,t

+
∑
c=(r,s)∈C
∑
t∈T
(pis,t − pir,t)τc,t
The first line of equation (22) represents the willingness to pay or the cost of each bid,
whereas the second and third represent the net amount of money to be paid or received. The
next theorem shows us that the latter is equal to zero if the clearing condition (C1) is satisfied.
The simplified expression of the economic surplus is equivalent to the objective of the welfare
maximization problem in [16, Section II.B].
Theorem 4.9 Let (pi, β, ϕ, δ, τ) be within the given bounds and satisfy condition (C1), then the
economic surplus is given by
ω(β, ϕ, δ) =
∑
a∈A
∑
t∈T
 ∑
h∈Ha,t
∫ δh
0
mh(z)dz +
∑
b∈Ba
pb qb,t βb +
∑
f∈Fa
p f q f ϕ f ,t

=
∑
h∈H
(
phδh − 12∆phδ
2
h
)
+
∑
b∈B
t∈T
pb qb,t βb +
∑
f∈F
t∈T
p f q f ϕ f ,t .
1In 2007: Energinet.dk: 100% to reduce tariffs, Fingrid: 100% to build new lines, Statnett: 100% to reduction, Svenska Kraftnät:
100% to build new lines. (cf. http://www.nordpoolspot.com)
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Proof By construction we have C =
⋃˙
a∈AC+a =
⋃˙
a∈AC−a . With this equation we get for all t ∈ T∑
c=(r,s)∈C
(pis,t − pir,t)τc,t =
∑
a∈A
pia,t
(∑
c∈C−a
τc,t −
∑
c∈C+a
τc,t
)
. (23)
Combining the above with constraint (C1) and substituting into (21) yields the desired result.
Observe that the objective function obtained in Theorem 4.9 is a quadratic, concave function
and does not involve price variables pi or flow variables τ. While this is convenient for the actual
computation, these variables still have to satisfy the stated conditions and so they implicitly
influence the economic surplus.
The problem formulation (MPEC) with the objective function as stated above is in prin-
ciple solvable by convex Mixed-Integer Quadratic Programming solvers like IBM CPLEX if
we linearize the price conditions by using the big-M method. Solving real world instances
with this technique however is very hard, because each non-convex quadratic price constraint
must be modeled by using an auxiliary binary variable. For the considered instances IBM
CPLEX was not able to obtain feasible solutions or improve provided warm-start solutions
within 30 minutes. We also observed that MINLP solvers and general MIQP solvers like BON-
MIN, COUENNE, SCIP, and BARON were not able to solve a typical instance of the relaxed
(QPBidCut) model to optimality within 10 minutes1. This indicates that these solvers will not
be able to solve the the problem to optimality within 10 minutes if we add the non-convex com-
plementarity conditions. This is clearly unsatisfactory as the actual market coupling auction
needs to be cleared within 10 minutes. We therefore propose a heuristic and an exact algorithm
for this problem.
5. Optimality conditions
In this section we define a relaxation of (MPEC) and analyze the optimality conditions of this
problem. Based on this analysis we derive a heuristic and an exact algorithm that performs very
well in practice. We say that (β∗, ϕ∗) is a bid selection if β∗ ∈ {0, 1}B and ϕ∗ ∈ {0, 1}F×T . Note
that a bid selection does not necessarily satisfy the block price condition.
We consider the following parameterized and relaxed version of (MPEC). We relax all price
constraints and assume that a fixed bid selection (β∗, ϕ∗) is exogenously given:
max
∑
h∈H
∫ δh
0
mh(u) du +
∑
b∈B, t∈T
pb qb,t β∗b +
∑
f∈F, t∈T
p f q f ϕ∗f ,t
s.t. [pi] ∀a ∈ A, t ∈ T
∑
h∈Ha,t
δh +
∑
c∈C+a
τc,t −
∑
c∈C−a
τc,t +
∑
b∈Ba
qb,t β∗b +
∑
f∈Fa
q f ϕ∗f ,t = 0
[v] ∀h ∈ H δh ≤ δh
[v] ∀h ∈ H − δh ≤ δh (QPRelaxβ∗,ϕ∗)
[µ] ∀c ∈ C, t ∈ T τc,t − τc,t ≤ 0
[ρ] ∀c ∈ C, t ∈ T τc,t − τc,t−1 − τ˜c ≤ 0
[µ] ∀c ∈ C, t ∈ T − τc,t + τc,t ≤ 0
[ρ] ∀c ∈ C, t ∈ T τc,t−1 − τc,t − τ˜c ≤ 0
1Run on a compute server with two 6-Core AMD Opteron 2435 (2.6GHz) CPUs, 64GB RAM, and 64-bit Debian.
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Note that (QPRelaxβ∗,ϕ∗) is a parameterized optimization problem where the binary variables
(β∗, ϕ∗) are exogenously given parameters. It is a convex optimization problem with a polyhe-
dral feasible region. Therefore, it is well defined to associate dual variables with every primal
constraint. The dual variables are denoted by the Greek letters that are given in squared brack-
ets. The next theorem will show that in this relaxation we do not need to require the filling
condition (C8) or the flow price condition (C7) explicitly as these naturally follow from the
KKT conditions.
Theorem 5.1 (Natural spot price characteristics) Let (β∗, ϕ∗) be an exogenously given fixed
bid selection, i.e., β∗ and ϕ∗ are exogenously given parameters. A feasible solution (δ, τ) to
(QPRelaxβ∗,ϕ∗) is an optimal solution if and only if there exist prices pi so that (δ, pi) satisfies
the filling condition and (τ, pi) satisfies the flow price condition. These prices are given by the
optimal dual variables to the clearing condition of (QPRelaxβ∗,ϕ∗).
Proof Let (β∗, ϕ∗) be a fixed bid selection. The objective of the parameterized optimization
problem (QPRelaxβ∗,ϕ∗) is concave and continuous differentiable and the constraints are affine
linear. The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions provide the following: A primal feasible
solution (δ, τ) to (QPRelaxβ∗,ϕ∗) is an optimal solution if and only if there exist dual variables
pi, v, v, µ, µ, ρ, ρ with
v, v, µ, µ, ρ, ρ ≥ 0 (24)
∀a ∈ A, t ∈ T , h ∈ Ha,t −mh(δh) + pia,t + vh − vh = 0 (25)
∀c = (r, s) ∈ C, t ∈ T (µc,t − µc,t) + (ρc,t − ρc,t) + [(ρc,t+1 − ρc,t+1)] = pis,t − pir,t (26)
∀a ∈ A, t ∈ T , h ∈ Ha,t (δh − δh) vh = 0 (27)
(−δh + δh) vh = 0 (28)
∀c = (r, s) ∈ C, t ∈ T (τc,t − τc,t) µc,t = 0 (29)
(τc,t − τc,t−1 − τ˜c) ρc,t = 0 (30)
(−τc,t + τc,t) µc,t = 0 (31)
(τc,t−1 − τc,t − τ˜c) ρc,t = 0, (32)
where the term in squared brackets is only added if t + 1 ∈ T . The conditions (24) to (26) are
the dual feasibility conditions and conditions (27) to (32) are the complementarity conditions.
Observe that equations (24), (26), and (29) to (32) imply that (τ, pi) fulfills the flow price condi-
tion (C7). The filling condition (C8) corresponds to the equations (24), (25), and (27) to (28).

We will later use Theorem 5.1 to extend solutions to (QPRelaxβ∗,ϕ∗) to feasible ones for
(MPEC).
6. Uniqueness of a solution
In the following section we will discuss uniqueness aspects of the computed solution. More
precisely, we will show that the economic surplus for a given bid selection is unique. The flows
and the prices however are not necessarily unique as we will see. Suppose that an algorithm
finds an optimal solution to (MPEC). We will see that if we fix the binary variables in (MPEC)
to the optimal values, then all feasible solutions to the remaining model have the same objective
value, thus the remaining model is just a feasibility problem. In practice there exist several
feasible solutions to the remaining model. For this reason an auctioneer must define rules that
Optimization Methods and Software 21
C
25€
B
25€
A
25€
333.33 MW
333.33 MW
666.67 MW
C
25€
B
25€
A
25€
1000.00 MW
1000.00 MW
0.0 MW
Figure 6. Both flows generate the same economic surplus.
determine a unique solution among these feasible solutions. In practice SESAM and COSMOS
use slightly different rules to choose unique solutions. For the sake of exposition we propose a
simple rule that chooses unique flows and prices without changing the total economic surplus.
At first an algorithm chooses a bid selection, then a unique flow is chosen, and finally a unique
price. As a corollary of 5.1 we obtain:
Corollary 6.1 Let (β∗, ϕ∗) be a fixed bid selection and let (δ∗, τ∗) be a feasible solution to
the parameterized optimization problem (QPRelaxβ∗,ϕ∗). Then (δ∗, τ∗) is an optimal solution to
(QPRelaxβ∗,ϕ∗) if and only if there exist prices pi∗ that satisfy the filling condition and the flow
price condition.
6.1. Unique economic surplus for a given bid selection
Let (β∗, ϕ∗) be a bid selection. Recall that the model (MPEC) requires the filling condition and
the flow price condition to be satisfied. We can therefore only construct a solution to (MPEC)
from a solution to (QPRelaxβ∗,ϕ∗) if there exist prices that satisfy the filling and the flow price
condition. Fortunately, these are exactly the KKT optimality conditions of (QPRelaxβ∗,ϕ∗). Let
(δ∗, τ∗) be a feasible solution to (QPRelaxβ∗,ϕ∗) and suppose that there exist prices that satisfy
the filling condition and the flow price condition. Corollary 6.1 provides that in this case (δ∗, τ∗)
is an optimal solution to (QPRelaxβ∗,ϕ∗). There exists exactly one optimal objective value for
each parameterized (QPRelaxβ∗,ϕ∗). If we fix the bid selection in the model (MPEC) then the
remaining degrees of freedom cannot influence the economic surplus anymore.
6.2. Uniqueness of hourly bid execution
Let (β∗, ϕ∗) be a bid selection and let I ⊂ H be the indices of linear bid curves with a strict
decreasing marginal willingness to pay / costs function mh, i.e.,
I := {h ∈ H | ∆ph , 0} .
An optimal solution to (QPRelaxβ∗,ϕ∗) is unique with respect to δI , as ω is strictly concave with
respect to δI (cf. [6]).
6.3. Choosing unique flows
The optimality of a solution to (QPRelaxβ∗,ϕ∗) and the constraints in Section 4.1 are not sufficient
to imply a unique flow. This follows from the non-uniqueness of the execution state of some
linear bid curves (those with ∆ph = 0). To obtain a unique flow, we minimize the squared flow
while fixing the economic surplus. In Figure 6 an example of a non-unique flow is depicted.
The left part shows the solution with minimized squared flows. In this example the prices of the
adjacent areas coincide and there is no congestion rent.
The following model selects a unique flow: Let (β∗, ϕ∗) be a bid selection, (δ∗, τ∗) be an
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optimal solution to (QPRelaxβ∗,ϕ∗), and let J ⊂ {h ∈ H | ∆ph = 0} be the set of linear bid curves
with non-unique execution state.
min
∑
t∈T
∑
c∈C
τ2c,t (FixFlow)
s.t. The economic surplus must not change (cf. Theorem 4.9):∑
h∈J
phδh =
∑
h∈J
phδ∗h
Clearing condition (cf. (C1)):
∀a ∈ A, t ∈ T∑
h∈J∩Ha,t
δh +
∑
c∈C+a
τc,t −
∑
c∈C−a
τc,t =
∑
h∈J∩Ha,t
δ∗h +
∑
c∈C+a
τ∗c,t −
∑
c∈C−a
τ∗c,t
Upper bounds, lower bounds, and ramp rate:
∀h ∈ J δh ≤ δh ≤ δh
∀c ∈ C, t ∈ T τc,t ≤ τc,t ≤ τc,t
∀c ∈ C, t ∈ T − τ˜c ≤ τc,t − τc,t−1 ≤ τ˜c
Note that the objective is strictly convex and the constraints are affine linear. So the obtained
solution is unique with respect to the flow. The unique flow determines a unique net export per
area and hour, therefore also the execution state of the linear bid curves in J is unique.
6.4. Choosing unique prices
In this section we will explain a way of how to obtain unique prices. Let (β∗, ϕ∗) be a bid
selection and (δ∗, τ∗) an optimal solution to (QPRelaxβ∗,ϕ∗) with unique flows. Then there exist
prices pi∗ that satisfy the filling condition and the flow price condition. The following example
will illustrate that these prices are not unique in general.
Suppose that there is only one market area a, and one time slot t. Let the hourly bid curve
LHa,t be parallel to the price axis in a price interval I (i.e., no volume change). Let δ∗ be an
optimal solution to (QPRelaxβ∗,ϕ∗) and let pi∗ be a price that satisfies the filling condition. The
flow price condition is trivially satisfied as there exists no interconnector. If pi∗ is in I then all
prices in I satisfy the filling condition.
The following model takes as input a given bid selection and an optimal solution to
(QPRelaxβ∗,ϕ∗), and then determines unique prices by minimizing the squared prices subject
to all price conditions.
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min (squared prices)
∑
a∈A
∑
t∈T
pi2a,t (QPPrice)
s.t. (price constraints)
∀a ∈ A, b ∈ Ba β∗b
∑
t∈T
(pb − pia,t) qb,t ≥ 0 (C5)
∀a ∈ A, f ∈ Fa, t ∈ T ϕ∗f ,t(p f − pia,t) sgn(q f ) ≥ 0 (C6)
∀c = (r, s) ∈ C, t ∈ T (µc,t − µc,t) + (ρc,t − ρc,t) + [(ρc,t+1 − ρc,t+1)] = pis,t − pir,t (C7)
∀c ∈ C, t ∈ T (τ∗c,t − τc,t) µc,t = 0 (C7)
∀c ∈ C, t ∈ T (−τ∗c,t + τc,t) µc,t = 0 (C7)
∀c ∈ C, t ∈ T (τ∗c,t − τ∗c,t−1 − τ˜c) ρc,t = 0 (C7)
∀c ∈ C, t ∈ T (τ∗c,t−1 − τ∗c,t − τ˜c) ρc,t = 0 (C7)
∀c ∈ C, t ∈ T µc,t, µc,t, ρc,t, ρc,t ≥ 0 (C7)
∀a ∈ A, t ∈ T , h ∈ Ha,t − mh(δ∗h) + pia,t + vh − vh = 0 (C8)
∀a ∈ A, t ∈ T , h ∈ Ha,t (δ∗h − δh) vh = 0 (C8)
∀a ∈ A, t ∈ T , h ∈ Ha,t (−δ∗h + δh) vh = 0 (C8)
∀a ∈ A, t ∈ T , h ∈ Ha,t vh, vh ≥ 0 (C8)
∀a ∈ A, t ∈ T pia,t ∈ R
Observe that the filling condition, the flow price condition, and the bid price constraints
simplify to linear constraints, because the flow τ∗, the hourly bid execution δ∗, and the bid
selection (β∗, ϕ∗) are fixed.
7. The bid cut heuristic and an exact algorithm
We will now present the proposed algorithm to solve the clearing problem. The basic idea is
to relax all price constraints. For example we allow that block or flex bids incur a loss. The
following model is similar to (QPRelaxβ∗,ϕ∗), but this time the bid selection is not fixed: The
model can choose the best bid selection in terms of the total economic surplus. We will see that
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an optimal solution to this model has similar properties to those in Theorem 5.1.
max (economic surplus)
∑
h∈H
∫ δh
0
mh(u)du +
∑
b∈B
t∈T
pb qb,t βb +
∑
f∈F
t∈T
p f q f ϕ f ,t (QPBidCut)
s.t. (quantity constraints)
∀a ∈ A, t ∈ T
∑
h∈Ha,t
δh +
∑
b∈Ba
qb,tβb +
∑
f∈Fa
q fϕ f ,t =
∑
c∈C−a
τc,t −
∑
c∈C+a
τc,t (C1)
∀c ∈ C, t ∈ T − τ˜c ≤ τc,t − τc,t−1 ≤ τ˜c (C2)
∀(b, c) ∈ L βb ≤ βc (C3)
∀ f ∈ F
∑
t∈T
ϕ f ,t ≤ 1 (C4)
∀b ∈ B βb ∈ {0, 1}
∀ f ∈ F, t ∈ T ϕ f ,t ∈ {0, 1}
∀c ∈ C, t ∈ T τc,t ∈ [τc,t, τc,t]
∀h ∈ H δh ∈ [δh, δh]
Theorem 7.1 Let (β∗, ϕ∗, δ∗, τ∗) be an optimum solution to (QPBidCut). Then there exist prices
pi that satisfy the filling condition and the flow price condition. The objective value ω(β∗, ϕ∗, δ∗)
is the economic surplus in the point (β∗, ϕ∗, δ∗, τ∗).
Proof Let (β∗, ϕ∗, δ∗, τ∗) be optimal for (QPBidCut). Then (β∗, ϕ∗) is a fixed bid selection and
(δ∗, τ∗) is optimal for (QPRelaxβ∗,ϕ∗). Then Theorem 5.1 yields the existence of prices that satisfy
the filling condition and the flow price condition. Every feasible solution to (QPBidCut) satisfies
the clearing condition (C1). Therefore, Theorem 4.9 yields that ω(β∗, ϕ∗, δ∗) is the economic
surplus. 
Note that the theorem above only guarantees that the filling condition and the flow price
condition can be satisfied in an optimal solution. It does not guarantee that none of the executed
block bids or flexible bids incurs a loss.
Suppose now that we have an optimal solution to (QPBidCut). Then we can find prices that
satisfy the filling condition and the flow price condition, but there might exist block or flexible
bids that incur a loss. Thus the solution is not feasible for (MPEC). In this case an additional
constraint, a so called bid cut, is added to the problem. This constraint cuts off the infeasible
bid selection and a class of similar bid selections. This process is repeated until a selection is
found that is feasible for (MPEC). The feasibility of a selection can be checked with a model
that is similar to (QPPrice). As shown in Theorem 7.1 the flow price condition (C7) and the
filling condition (C8) can be satisfied. The block and flexible bid price condition must be re-
laxed. Instead of choosing unique prices, we are now interested in minimizing the violation
of these two conditions. Model (LPPrice) shows these modifications. We introduced a positive
continuous slack variable λb for every executed block or flexible bid b and used them to relax
the according block or flexible bid price condition. Instead of minimizing the squared prices we
minimize the sum of these slack variables. Now the variable λb models the loss of the executed
block or flexible bid b.
Let (β∗, ϕ∗, δ∗, τ∗) be an optimal solution to (QPBidCut), then the parameterized linear pro-
gram (LPPrice) checks whether the solution is feasible to (MPEC): If there exists a solution
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with λ = 0, then we have found a feasible solution to (MPEC).
min (incurred loss)
∑
b∈B
λb +
∑
f∈F
λ f (LPPrice)
s.t. (price constraints)
∀a ∈ A, b ∈ Ba β∗b
∑
t∈T
(pb − pia,t) qb,t ≥ −λb (relaxed C5)
∀a ∈ A, b ∈ Ba λb ≥ 0
∀a ∈ A, f ∈ Fa, t ∈ T ϕ∗f ,t(p f − pia,t) sgn(q f ) ≥ −λ f (relaxed C6)
∀a ∈ A, f ∈ Fa λ f ≥ 0
∀c = (r, s) ∈ C, t ∈ T (µc,t − µc,t) + (ρc,t − ρc,t) + [(ρc,t+1 − ρc,t+1)] = pis,t − pir,t (C7)
∀c ∈ C, t ∈ T (τ∗c,t − τc,t) µc,t = 0 (C7)
∀c ∈ C, t ∈ T (−τ∗c,t + τc,t) µc,t = 0 (C7)
∀c ∈ C, t ∈ T (τ∗c,t − τ∗c,t−1 − τ˜c) ρc,t = 0 (C7)
∀c ∈ C, t ∈ T (τ∗c,t−1 − τ∗c,t − τ˜c) ρc,t = 0 (C7)
∀c ∈ C, t ∈ T µc,t, µc,t, ρc,t, ρc,t ≥ 0 (C7)
∀a ∈ A, t ∈ T , h ∈ Ha,t − mh(δ∗h) + pia,t + vh − vh = 0 (C8)
∀a ∈ A, t ∈ T , h ∈ Ha,t (δ∗h − δh) vh = 0 (C8)
∀a ∈ A, t ∈ T , h ∈ Ha,t (−δ∗h + δh) vh = 0 (C8)
∀a ∈ A, t ∈ T , h ∈ Ha,t vh, vh ≥ 0 (C8)
∀a ∈ A, t ∈ T pia,t ∈ R
We will now introduce two families of cuts that can be used. The first one works very well
in practice but is inexact as it might converge to a suboptimal solution. The second family of
cuts is exact but more cuts have to be added. We will later report timings for both families in
Section 8.
Definition 7.2 Let (β∗, ϕ∗, δ∗, τ∗) be an optimal of (QPBidCut) and let pi∗ be an optimal solution
to (LPPrice). The set of bids that incur a loss at prices pi∗ is given by
Bloss = {b ∈ B | β∗b = 1 and
∑
t∈T
(pb − pi∗a,t)qb,t < 0}
and Floss = { f ∈ F | ex. t ∈ T with ϕ∗f ,t = 1 and (p f − pi∗a,t) sgn(q f ) < 0}.
where Bloss is the set of executed block bids that incur a loss at prices pi∗ and Floss is the set
of executed flexible bids that incur a loss at prices pi∗. The linear constraint that prohibits the
execution of at least one bid of the set Bloss ∪ Floss is given by
Cut(Bloss, Floss) :
∑
b∈Bloss
βb +
∑
f∈Floss,t∈T :ϕ∗f ,t=1
ϕ f ,t ≤ |Bloss| + |Floss| − 1.
We refer to this class of constraints as Bid Cuts (cf. [15, Definition 5.2]).
As mentioned above, for this family of cuts, the obtained solution might be slightly subopti-
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mal, i.e., these cuts provide us with a heuristic. Nonetheless, this cut can be applied iteratively
as shown in Algorithm 1 or it can be incorporated into a branch-and-cut framework. The latter is
the more effective one as it provides a very fast heuristic: The solving process of IBM CPLEX
is only started once and the bid cuts are injected directly into the process by using callback
functions.
If the Bid Cut is replaced with a less aggressive one that only removes exactly one invalid bid
selection at a time, then the resulting algorithm will converge to the globally optimal solution.
For example, the following family of cuts separates exactly one invalid bid selection.
Definition 7.3 Let (β∗, ϕ∗, δ∗, τ∗) be a solution of (QPBidCut). Then following inequality cuts
off the bid selection (β∗, ϕ∗):
Cut(β∗, ϕ∗) :
∑
b∈B:β∗b=0
βb +
∑
f∈F,t∈T :ϕ∗f ,t=0
ϕ f ,t +
∑
b∈B:β∗b=1
(1 − βb) +
∑
f∈F,t∈T :ϕ∗f ,t=1
(1 − ϕ f ,t) ≥ 1
We refer to this class of constraints as exact bid cuts (cf. [15, Theorem 5.4], “no-good cuts” in
[4]).
The most effective way to implement an exact algorithm that uses the exact bid cuts is to
inject them into a branch-and-cut framework. We decided to call this algorithm Branch-And-
Cut Decomposition, because we decompose the model into the upper level problem (QPBidCut)
and the parameterized lower level problems (LPPrice) and use exact cuts to connect both levels.
Algorithm 1 Iterative Bid Cut Heuristic
Input: An instance of the model (QPBidCut)
Output: (pi∗, β∗, ϕ∗, δ∗, τ∗) feasible for (MPEC)
done← false
i← 0
while ¬done do
(β∗, ϕ∗, δ∗, τ∗) ← solve (QPBidCut).
(τ∗) ← solve (FixFlow) with input values (β∗, ϕ∗, δ∗).
(pi∗, Biloss, F
i
loss) ← solve (LPPrice) with input values (β∗, ϕ∗, δ∗, τ∗).
if |Biloss ∪ F iloss| = 0, then
done← true
else
add Cut(Biloss, F
i
loss) to the model (QPBidCut).
end if
i← i + 1
end while
Return (pi∗, β∗, ϕ∗, δ∗, τ∗).
8. Results
We will now present some computational results for the algorithms presented in Section 7.
We compare the Bid Cut Heuristic and Branch-and-Cut Decomposition with the commercial
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algorithm EMCC Optimizer of Deutsche Börse Systems which is currently used by European
Market Coupling Company (EMCC) to determine flows between the NPS and the CWE region.
For our computational tests we used 79 realistic instances that contain 10 European market ar-
eas, about 600 combinatorial bids, and about 31700 linear bid curves. All tests were performed
on the same hardware1 using IBM CPLEX 12.1 as mixed integer linear/quadratic programming
solver. In our tests, we did not incorporate the (FixFlow) model, as its sole purpose is the redis-
tribution of flow without affecting the overall economic surplus. Moreover, our tests indicated
that fixing the flow impacts the prices only in very pathological cases that can be disregarded
in this paper. We will first give a brief introduction to an early version of the EMCC Optimizer
and provide some statistics. Then we discuss the two proposed algorithms from above.
8.1. EMCC Optimizer
The version of the EMCC Optimizer that we used in our comparison is version 2.1.2 that was
used in 2009. This algorithm is based on computing a start solution with a linear program
(cf. [13]) and then checking the feasibility of the bid selection. If the bid selection is not feasible,
executed bids are excluded successively until the solution is feasible. Then the solution will be
improved by trying to include not executed bids. For more details see [7, Chapter 4.3.2]. In some
cases this search phase is very time consuming and cannot be completed within 10 minutes2. In
this case, the last feasible solution will be returned; in fact the start solution for the last phase is
already feasible however might be suboptimal. In our analysis, for 22% of the instances this last
phase could not be completed on time. The average time for computing the solutions amounts
to 6 minutes and in at least 15% of the cases the bid selection was provably optimal. In 76%
of the cases the selections could be slightly improved by our algorithms and in the remaining
cases we could neither prove nor disprove the optimality of the selection. The relative distance
to the best upper bound, i.e., the relative gap, averages to 2.577×10−6; a selection is considered
optimal here if the relative gap is below 1×10−12 which roughly corresponds to one euro cent.
On average there are 10.76 rejected combinatorial bids, so called paradoxically rejected bids
(PRB) (cf. [14]) that could potentially have generated a net profit. However, in most cases these
bids cannot be included without decreasing the overall economic surplus or rejecting other bids
that are in the money.
Some of our ideas where used to improve later versions of the EMCC solver and, therefore,
increased the daily economic surplus indirectly. For example the usage of only one aggregated
hourly bid curve per area and hour instead of separate demand and supply curves decreased the
computing time significantly and allowed for testing more solution candidates in less time.
8.2. Bid Cut Heuristic
The tests are based on a branch-and-cut version of the Bid Cut Heuristic. In at least 38% of
the tests the absolute gap is smaller than one euro cent. The average relative gap amounts to
1.926×10−6. In 96% of the cases, the solutions found by the Bid Cut Heuristic could not be out-
performed by any other algorithm of the test. On average there are only 4.65 PRBs leading to a
potentially higher overall acceptance of the prices and executed quantities. The most important
property of the algorithm however is its running time which averages to only 4.1 seconds. The
maximum computing time was 1.1 minute and so clearing within the 10 minutes is easily pos-
sible. Moreover, due to being able to compute the solution way before the time limit is reached
the auction can also be run on different machines with identical results. This would not be pos-
sible if the process would be stopped by the time limit as in this case the actual performance
1Intel Xeon Core E5440 with 8 GB memory
2The limit of 10 minutes reflected the operational requirements when the tests of this algorithm were performed (September 2009).
For production it has been changed to 15 minutes.
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Algorithm Abs. Gap Best known PRBs Relative Computing Time ≤ 10 Min Stopped at
≤ 0.01 EUR Bid Selection Gap Average (s) Min (ms) Max (s) max Time
EMCC Optim. 2.1.2 ≥ 15% 24% 10.76 2.577E-6 361.4 46000 600.0 22%
Bid Cut Heuristic ≥ 38% 96% 4.65 1.926E-6 4.1 493 62.8 0%
B&C Decomposition ≥ 38% 100% 4.62 1.924E-6 (9.3) 390.8 1114 600.0 65%
Table 1. Numerical results for 79 realistic instances
of the machine would potentially impact the computed prices. Note that reproduction of prices
is crucial for market transparency and confidence and an algorithm that is terminated by a time
limit is less suited for market clearing as the results can be influenced by side effects like CPU
load that is generated by other processes.
8.3. B&C Decomposition
The Branch-and-Cut Decomposition is slower than the Bid Cut Heuristic. However using it, we
can prove that the absolute gap of a solution is smaller than one euro cent. It uses the solutions
of the Bid Cut Heuristic as warm start solutions. In 38% of the cases the algorithm finishes in
about 9 seconds by finding the optimal solution and proving optimality. In the other cases the
solver was stopped when reaching the time limit without reducing the absolute gap to one euro
cent. During the computation 4% of the bid selections found by the Bid Cut Heuristic could be
improved. This reduced the relative gap to 1.924×10−6 and the number of PRBs was reduced
to 4.62. The improvement which is not significant indicates that the solutions obtained via Bid
Cut Heuristic are very good.
In Table 1 we summarize the results. More details about each instance can be found in Tables
C1 and C2. We can see that the relative gaps of all algorithms have the same order of magnitude.
The best solutions are found by the Branch-and-Bound Decomposition, but the improvement
of the relative gap in comparison to the Bid Cut Heuristic is not significant. The best suited
algorithm in terms of time consumption and quality of the solution is the Bid Cut Heuristic that
finds very good bid selections in about 4 seconds.
9. Concluding remarks
Our proposed approach works very well in practice and we were able to derive desired prop-
erties from the formulation as an optimization problem. A possible route for improvement is
to replace the bid cut by an infeasibility cut of the generalized Benders decomposition [4, 9].
The main difficulty here is to find a non-trivial cut that is strong enough to work as fast as
the bid cut. Otherwise the performance of the algorithm for day-ahead market clearing might
not be sufficient enough. For example the simple exact bid cut (cf. Definition 7.3) used for the
Branch-and-Cut Decomposition is a valid Benders infeasibility cut, but the resulting algorithm
is too slow.
A nice additional consequence of the presented model are the transparent pricing rules. In
fact, for a given bid selection optimality can be checked easily: A market participant could
collect all relevant information to check the flow price condition. It is clear that a solution
will also satisfy the filling condition, so by applying Theorem 5.1 the participant knows that
the economic surplus is maximal for the actual bid selection. This transparency is crucial for
market confidence and liquidity.
We would like to mention that the flow price condition is subject to change in the future as
it will include deadbands: losses during transmission via an interconnector. While this change
will alter the optimality conditions of our model, our model can be adjusted to incorporate
deadbands.
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Appendix A. Simplifications of the flow price condition
Proof [Proof of eq. (11).] Suppose that there is no ramping on any interconnector. Then we
have τ˜c = ∞ for all c ∈ C so that with (9) and (10) it follows that ρc,t = ρc,t = 0 for all c ∈ C
and t ∈ T . Equation (6) before simplifies to
(µc,t − µc,t) + pir,t − pis,t = 0. (A1)
We also know that τc,t < τc,t implies µc,t = 0 and that τc,t > τc,t implies µc,t = 0. Together with
(A1) we therefore conclude
∀c = (r, s) ∈ C, t ∈ T pis,t − pir,t = (µc,t − µc,t)
≤ 0 , τc,t < τc,t≥ 0 , τc,t < τc,t .
Using this equation we can interpret the term µc,t − µc,t as the shadow price of available trans-
mission capacity: an additional unit of transmission capacity increases the economic surplus by
|µc,t − µc,t| euro (on a sufficiently small interval). 
Proof [Proof of eq. (12).] Suppose that there is ramping on the interconnector c ∈ C and that
the ramping condition (C2) is only binding in the two consecutive time slots t and t+1. Suppose
further that there is still available transfer capacity in that time window. In other words we have
τc,t < τc,t < τc,t and τc,t+1 < τc,t+1 < τc,t+1. Together with equation (7) and (8) it follows that
µc,t = µc,t
= µc,t+1 = µc,t+1
= 0. We assume that the ramping condition is active only between
hour t and t + 1, and that it is active in forward direction (see Figure A1). This yields that
−τ˜c < (τc,t+1 − τc,t) = τ˜c and for all u ∈ T with u , t we have −τ˜c < (τc,u − τc,u−1) < τ˜c. Thus
ρc,u and ρc,u vanish, except for ρc,t+1. From equation (6) and (5) we get
pir,t − pis,t = ρc,t+1 ≥ 0 and
pir,t+1 − pis,t+1 = − ρc,t+1 ≤ 0.
These statements together provide −(pir,t − pis,t) = −ρc,t+1 = (pir,t+1 − pis,t+1), pir,t > pis,t, and
pir,t+1 < pis,t+1. We can now interpret the variables ρ as the shadow prices for ramping, in short
the ramping prices. Here the economic surplus could by increased by ρc,t+1 euro if the ramp
rate would be increased by one unit (again on a sufficiently small interval). 
Proof [Proof of eq. (13) and (14).] See also [15, Theorem 4.4]. Let the flow-price pair (τ, pi)
satisfy the filling condition, let c = (r, s) ∈ C, t ∈ T , and pir,t < pis,t. Assume that τc,t < τc,t
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Figure A1. Active ramping condition in forward direction, ramp rate = 500 MW
REFERENCES 31
and τc,t − τc,t−1 < τ˜c [, and τc,t − τc,t+1 < τ˜c], then we have µc,t = 0, ρc,t = 0 [, and ρc,t+1 = 0].
Consequently we obtain with (6) and (5)
( µc,t︸︷︷︸
=0
− µ
c,t︸︷︷︸
≥0
) + ( ρc,t︸︷︷︸
=0
− ρ
c,t︸︷︷︸
≥0
) + [ρ
c,t+1︸︷︷︸
=0
− ρc,t+1︸︷︷︸
≥0
] + pir,t − pis,t︸    ︷︷    ︸
<0
= 0
which is a contradiction. Implication (14) can be proven in a similar fashion. 
Appendix B. MIP formulation of the filling condition
The filling condition can be easily formulated using binary auxiliary variables. For each linear
bid curve h ∈ H := {0, . . . , n} we introduce a binary variable γh ∈ {0, 1}. Without loss of
generality we assume that the linear bid curves are sorted at first by areas and hours, and then
by descending prices, that is,
∀a ∈ A, t ∈ T , h ∈ Ha,t \max Ha,t mh(δh) ≥ mh+1(δh+1).
Recall that mh(δh) ≥ mh(δh). The filling condition can now be formulated like this:
∀a ∈ A, t ∈ T , h ∈ Ha,t \max Ha,t
δh − δh
δh − δh
≥ γh ≥
δh+1 − δh+1
δh+1 − δh+1
.
Note that the presented algorithms do not rely on the inclusion of this condition. In fact, in-
cluding it does not impede the solving process. The slowdown arises due to the inclusion of
the filling condition combined with the price conditions of combinatorial bids. This is due to
having also to formulate the flow price condition by using a complicated MIP formulation and
this condition cannot be solved fast enough by standard solvers.
Appendix C. Presolving
Before starting the optimization process, we can compute upper and lower bounds for the prices.
For every area and hour we can determine the intersection of the hourly net curve with the price
axis. This price would be the clearing price if no block bid would be executed and no power
would be imported or exported. Now we assume that we have to import as much additional
power as possible and that all supply block bids are executed. The additional power must be
bought by hourly bids, thus the price decreases along the hourly net curve until all additional
power is consumed by hourly bids. This price represents a lower bound for the specific area and
hour. Upper bounds can be determined similarly.
Formula (C1) is directly derived from the clearing constraint (C1) and shows the upper and
lower quantity bounds of the hourly net curves. The price bounds can be derived from these
quantity bounds.
∑
h∈Ha,t
δh
≤ −
∑
b∈Ba min{0, qb,t} −
∑
f∈Fa min{0, q f } +
∑
c∈C−a τc,t −
∑
c∈C+a τc,t
≥ −∑b∈Ba max{0, qb,t} −∑ f∈Fa max{0, q f } + ∑c∈C−a τc,t −∑c∈C+a τc,t (C1)
With the help of these bounds the execution state of the blocks and hourly bids that always re-
alize a profit or incur a loss is given. The bounds can also be used to cut off infeasible classes of
bid selections in the branch-and-cut tree. We implemented theses techniques, but unfortunately
the solving process could not be enhanced significantly.
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Table C1. Detailed results, test cases 1-40. Computing times are measured in milliseconds.
# Comb. Linear Solver 2.1.2 Bid Cut Heuristic BnC Decomposition
Bids Bid Curves Comp. Time Rel. Gap PRBs Comp. Time Rel. Gap PRBs Comp. Time Rel. Gap PRBs
1 742 34536 299000 0 4 2632 0 4 6621 0 4
2 727 34726 * 821000 4.00E-10 8 3101 0 7 600565 0 7
3 792 35227 208000 3.19E-09 5 2017 3.19E-09 5 600562 3.19E-9 5
4 750 34733 476000 4.77E-08 10 2621 4.61E-08 7 600334 4.61E-8 7
5 685 32613 190000 4.64E-08 10 1881 0 6 4929 0 6
6 630 30065 350000 0 3 1086 0 3 3992 0 3
7 775 34516 * 883000 1.34E-08 8 2615 1.31E-08 7 600251 1.31E-8 7
8 772 33545 243000 2.22E-07 8 2260 1.70E-07 6 600339 1.70E-7 6
9 542 34876 578000 2.30E-07 5 2528 0 1 12653 0 1
10 595 31226 576000 1.99E-08 6 2199 0 5 53924 0 5
11 585 31888 116000 2.51E-06 17 10102 9.49E-07 5 600247 8.85E-7 5
12 598 33262 396000 4.51E-07 8 1968 0 3 9831 0 3
13 435 29590 112000 2.74E-06 9 9970 1.14E-06 7 600213 1.14E-6 7
14 558 31959 460000 3.63E-06 18 4531 1.84E-06 5 600232 1.84E-6 5
15 593 35384 399000 0 2 2143 0 2 7845 0 2
16 583 36302 248000 3.29E-06 9 2868 2.83E-06 2 600339 2.83E-6 2
17 585 37046 602000 3.78E-07 11 5676 1.88E-07 5 600272 1.88E-7 5
18 155 18195 111000 0 1 493 0 1 1114 0 1
19 149 18287 61000 0 1 543 0 1 1135 0 1
20 453 30471 141000 2.29E-07 9 1235 2.20E-07 2 600178 2.20E-7 2
21 201 30027 123000 3.21E-06 12 1871 0 3 6824 0 3
22 675 30027 149000 1.73E-06 12 1824 1.50E-06 5 600225 1.50E-6 5
23 701 31559 135000 5.85E-06 27 34961 5.92E-07 12 600210 5.92E-7 12
24 728 29902 440000 3.43E-06 4 1334 3.43E-06 4 600183 3.43E-6 4
25 651 30196 268000 3.24E-06 11 2366 3.11E-06 7 600216 3.11E-6 7
26 642 28589 162000 5.18E-06 4 2090 5.16E-06 3 600237 5.16E-6 3
27 622 31692 342000 3.40E-06 21 2720 3.25E-06 7 600177 3.25E-6 7
28 604 31535 268000 1.08E-07 4 1551 2.59E-08 3 600204 2.59E-8 3
29 707 33882 611000 5.34E-06 7 3430 5.33E-06 6 600201 5.33E-6 6
30 665 33821 249000 1.04E-08 2 1656 1.04E-08 2 600285 1.04E-8 2
31 684 33975 609000 2.39E-05 68 62814 5.04E-06 12 600231 5.04E-6 12
32 599 27453 181000 8.31E-06 6 2597 8.32E-06 6 600243 8.31E-6 6
33 420 27247 176000 9.49E-06 3 1227 9.49E-06 3 600222 9.49E-6 3
34 163 24801 46000 0 0 802 0 0 2620 0 0
35 142 26142 99000 2.40E-08 1 1020 0 1 3090 0 1
36 618 31584 362000 1.57E-07 12 2189 2.23E-07 7 600226 1.23E-7 7
37 249 27231 94000 0 1 1003 0 1 4403 0 1
38 609 29589 152000 3.78E-07 27 2279 4.41E-09 11 600224 4.41E-9 11
39 297 30596 102000 7.50E-07 7 1342 0 1 5729 0 1
40 318 30068 247000 0 2 1681 0 2 6123 0 2
*) Computing time was extended in this test so that the inclusion phase could be finished.
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Table C2. Detailed results, test cases 41-79. Computing times are measured in milliseconds.
# Comb. Linear Solver 2.1.2 Bid Cut Heuristic BnC Decomposition
Bids Bid Curves Comp. Time Rel. Gap PRBs Comp. Time Rel. Gap PRBs Comp. Time Rel. Gap PRBs
41 253 27288 158000 6.43E-08 5 1062 0 2 4626 0 2
42 604 29969 358000 7.12E-05 2 1459 7.12E-05 2 600261 7.12E-5 2
43 644 32188 361000 1.96E-07 9 1658 2.89E-08 4 600246 2.89E-8 4
44 683 32477 232000 0 2 1387 0 2 4125 0 2
45 695 33131 608000 1.64E-06 7 6630 1.62E-06 4 600293 1.62E-6 4
46 576 28686 142000 1.07E-06 22 6151 3.83E-07 7 600215 3.83E-7 7
47 476 26189 181000 1.27E-09 2 752 0 1 1862 0 1
48 655 29370 384000 3.90E-08 10 1666 0 8 16594 0 8
49 673 32226 396000 1.37E-05 12 3937 1.34E-05 7 600198 1.34E-5 7
50 667 33513 349000 6.50E-07 11 1817 0 1 8442 0 1
51 738 32883 621000 2.36E-07 12 2499 3.08E-08 5 600220 3.08E-8 5
52 628 29959 243000 4.84E-07 26 1508 2.96E-07 3 600195 2.96E-7 3
53 439 29670 324000 0 6 1607 0 6 3684 0 6
54 705 33437 604000 1.66E-06 18 2641 2.72E-09 5 600240 2.72E-9 5
55 691 33609 623000 3.53E-07 10 2148 0 4 6236 0 4
56 696 34061 494000 6.18E-08 6 2210 2.70E-08 4 600250 2.70E-8 4
57 692 33364 158000 9.78E-07 14 3282 7.97E-07 5 600246 7.97E-7 5
58 644 31157 254000 9.13E-07 15 3023 7.30E-07 6 600230 7.30E-7 6
59 562 30123 303000 1.05E-08 5 1388 0 4 5158 0 4
60 603 31833 567000 2.04E-09 7 2545 2.04E-09 7 600225 2.05E-9 7
61 660 34087 620000 6.46E-07 18 2259 1.89E-07 4 600293 1.89E-7 4
62 682 35228 611000 5.73E-08 14 2229 3.25E-09 5 600281 3.25E-9 5
63 675 35128 345000 0 2 1561 0 2 5709 0 2
64 713 34921 362000 1.62E-07 8 2180 1.30E-07 5 600326 1.30E-7 5
65 627 32606 203000 1.78E-06 21 1607 2.79E-08 5 600205 2.79E-8 5
66 680 35368 389000 0 5 2090 0 4 7680 0 4
67 674 34825 298000 6.11E-06 12 7555 5.75E-06 8 601153 5.75E-6 8
68 711 33534 610000 4.63E-07 24 1981 0 5 5924 0 5
69 730 32839 626000 1.12E-06 20 5031 7.99E-07 9 600253 7.99E-7 9
70 697 31728 341000 6.98E-07 23 1954 4.81E-08 4 600186 4.81E-8 4
71 737 33662 319000 2.36E-07 22 2816 8.64E-09 10 600230 8.64E-9 10
72 708 34162 497000 4.22E-07 9 1850 3.43E-07 6 600247 3.43E-7 6
73 765 34315 403000 7.74E-07 7 4061 4.81E-07 7 600262 5.08E-8 5
74 758 36456 * 745000 6.83E-07 18 3424 5.15E-07 7 600287 5.15E-7 7
75 542 34437 631000 1.49E-07 4 2029 0 1 7967 0 1
76 595 30812 610000 3.31E-06 18 2509 0 3 600227 0 3
77 585 31593 410000 1.57E-06 13 13883 1.30E-06 6 600248 1.30E-6 6
78 598 32966 479000 4.80E-07 12 2093 0 3 51173 0 3
79 558 31525 605000 3.87E-06 16 21331 1.52E-06 6 600212 1.52E-6 6
avg. 595 31692 361380 2.58E-06 10.76 4114 1.93E-06 4.65 390808 1.92E-6 4.62
*) Computing time was extended in this test so that the inclusion phase could be finished.
